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DIRECTED VERDICT IN MARYLAND: LESS OBVIOUS
APPLICATIONS OF A SIMPLE RULE
John A. Lynch, Jr. t
This Article examines the implications of Maryland Rule 552
with respect to directed verdicts in Maryland. The author
collects and discusses the significant cases establishing the
criteria for the granting of a directed verdict.
I.

INTRODUCTION

If the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Maryland' provides a
desirable dose of common sense to the arcane machinations of a
lawsuit, the Maryland appellate courts' construction of Rule 552 of
the Maryland Rules of Procedure,2 which sets out the procedure for a
directed verdict, has generally provided a beneficial limitation on the
opportunities for jury abuse. 3 This rule permits a trial judge, in

t A.B., St. Anselm's College, 1971; J.D. & LL.M., George Washington University

School of Law, 1974 & 1978; Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore
School of Law; Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. MD. CONST. art. XV, § 6 provides that the "right of trial by Jury of all issues of
fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be
inviolably preserved."
2. Maryland Rule 552 provides in part:
a. Motion for - Grounds to Be Stated.
In an action tried by a jury any party may move, at the close of
the evidence offered by an opponent or at the close of all the
evidence, for a directed verdict in his favor on any or all of the
issues. Such motion shall state the grounds therefor. An objection on
behalf of the adverse party to such motion shall be entered as of
course.
b. Offer of Evidence After Denial - Effect.
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event
that the motion is not granted without having reserved the right to
do so, and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made,
and in so doing he withdraws the motion.
c. Reservation of Decision by Court.
Instead of granting or denying the motion for a directed
verdict, the court may submit the case to the jury and reserve its
decision on the motion until after the verdict or discharge of the
jury, but for the purpose of appeal such reservation constitutes a
denial of the motion, unless judgment is rendered for the moving
party pursuant to Rule 563 (Judgment N.O.V.).
This article discusses specifically Rule 552, but the same general principles will
apply to a motion to dismiss under Rule 535 in non-jury trials in both equity
and common law cases. See Md. Rule 552 (annotations collecting cases).
3. 3 POE'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 294, at 528 (6th ed. H. Sachs 1970).
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appropriate instances, to decide an entire civil case, or a particular
issue thereof,4 as a matter of law without submitting it to the jury.5
The ostensible rationale for this action is that there does not have to
be deliberation by a jury on an issue when the evidence adduced
indicates that the issue involves no true fact question. s Stated
otherwise, if in the opinion of the trial judge only one set of facts may
reasonably be found, then the jury is not permitted to find another.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland and the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland have indicated in their many constructions of
Rule 552 that the directed verdict is a device to be utilized with great
caution. 7 Ordinarily, the burden of a party seeking a directed verdict
is heavy, as for instance, when a defendant moves for a directed
verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case. In reviewing a motion for
directed verdict the trial court must assume the truth of all credible
evidence tending to support the party against whom the verdict is
sought as well as all inferences of fact reasonably and fairly
deducible therefrom. 8
4. A trial judge may decide to submit a plaintiffs case to the jury on fewer theories
of liability than requested by the plaintiff. See Maszczenski v. Myers, 212 Md.
346, 354, 129 A.2d 109, 113 (1957). Such would amount to a partial directed
verdict for the defendant on the issues not submitted. A trial court judge might
also decide not to submit the issue of con~ibutory negligence to the jury. Brown
v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 491, 204 A.2d 526, 527 (1964). This would amount to a
directed verdict for the plaint!ff on that issue.
5. A trial judge, of course may deny the motion, submit the case or issue to the
jury and then grant the subsequent motion for judgment n.o.v. See Md. Rule
563. Alternatively, the trial judge may reverse on the motion for directed
verdict, submit the case to the jury and treat its reservation on the motiori for
directed verdict as a motion for judgment n.o.v. Md. Rule 563(a)(2). The
granting of a judgment n.o.v. is in essence the granting of a directed verdict
nunc pro tunc because the standard for viewing the evidence with respect to
such a motion is the same as that with respect to a directed verdict. Miller v.
Michalek, 13 Md. App. 16, 17,281 A.2d 117, 118 (1971).
This motion is not appropriate in nonjury cases as the rule itself states its
applicability in cases tried by a jury. See note 2 supra. See also Smith v. State
Roads Commission, 240 Md. 525, 539, 214 A.2d 792, 799 (1965). The equivalent
in Maryland in nonjury cases, i.e., a rule giving a party an opportunity to test
the sufficiency of the opposing partys' evidence before it is weighed by the trier
of fact, is Rule 535 which states that "any party. . . may move at the close of
evidence offered by an opponent for a dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law he has shown no right to relief." Md. Rule 535. Unlike the
motion for directed verdict, the motion to dismiss under Rule 535 may not be
made at the close of all the evidence, because at that point in a nonjury case, all
of the evidence is before the trier of fact, 240 Md. at 539-40, 214 A.2d at 799800. The standard in considering a motion under Rule 535 is the same as for a
motion under Rule 552. J. Whitson Rogers, Inc. v. Board, 285 Md. 653, 402 A.2d
608 (1979).
6. 3 POE'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 293, at 528 (6th ed. H. Sachs 1970).
7. Jacobson v. Julian, 246 Md. 549, 229 A.2d 108 (1967); Miller v. Michalek, 13
Md. App. 16, 281 A.2d 117 (1971).
8. Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296,328,389 A.2d
887, 905-06 (1978); Quality Discount Tires, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 282 Md. 7, 11, 382 A.2d 867,870 (1978); Levine v. RenIer, 272 Md. 1, 12,
320 A.2d 258, 264-65 (1974); Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 689, 284 A.2d
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After the trial court has thus viewed the evidence, it must deny
the motion "unless, in viewing the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, there is no legally sufficient evidence for the jury to
consider."9 A directed verdict, in other words, should not be granted
unless the evidence will permit only one inference of fact sustaining
the position of the movant. lO
With the above formulations in mind, the court of appeals has
stated, somewhat grandiloquently:
Maryland has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction we
know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is
sufficient to carry the case to the jury. The rule has been
stated as requiring submission if there be any evidence,
however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, and the weight and value of such evidence will be left
to the juryY
Implicit in this statement is the notion that mere presentation of any
evidence in support of the position of the party opposing the motion
is not per se sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. 12 The evidence

9.
10.

11.

12.

241, 243 (1971); Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 228, 257 A.2d 138, 142
(1969); Home Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Fuels Co., 252 Md. 407, 411, 250 A.2d
535, 537-38 (1969); Trionfo v. Hellman, 250 Md. 12, 15, 241 A.2d 554, 556
(1968); Smack v. Whitt, 249 Md. 532, 536, 240 A.2d 612, 615 (1968); City of
Baltimore v. Seidel, 44 Md. App. 465, 466, 409 A.2d 747, 748 (1980); Bullis
School v. Justus, 37 Md. App. 423, 425, 377 A.2d 876, 878 (1977); Gleason v.
Jack Alan Enterprises, Inc., 36 Md. App. 562, 565, 374 A.2d 408, 410 (1977);
Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 84, 373 A.2d 282, 284
(1977); Keene v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 35 Md. App. 250, 253, 370 A.2d 124,
126-27 (1977).
Home Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Fuels Co., 252 Md. 407, 411, 250 A.2d 535,
537-38 (1969).
Smack v. Jackson, 238 Md. 35,37,207 A.2d 511, 512 (1965); Baltimore Transit
Co. v. State ex rei. Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 434, 71 A.2d 442, 447 (1950);
Garozynski v. Daniel, 190 Md. 1, 4, 57 A.2d 339, 341 (948); Gleason v. Jack
Alan Enterprises, Inc., 36 Md. App. 562, 565, 374 A.2d 408, 410 (1977).
Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 554 (1965) (emphasis in
original). One jurisdiction which goes further than Maryland in submitting
issues to the jury on slight evidence is Alabama. The courts of that state cling
to the so-called "scintilla" rule. That rule was recently stated as follows:
"[Ilssues in civil cases must go to the jury if the evidence, or reasonable
inference therefrom, furnishes a mere glimmer, spark or smallest trace in
support of an issue." Elba Wood Prods., Inc. v. Brackin, 356 So. 2d 119, 123
(Ala. 1978). Sometimes, determining how many gossamers constitute "legally
sufficient" evidence rather than a scintilla, can be a difficult task. See Undeck
v. Consumers Discount Supermarket, 29 Md. App. 444, 453, 349 A.2d 635, 640
(1975).
The line between what is legally sufficient and insufficient to make out a prima
facie case can be nakedly quantitative, as in cases involving invasion of privacy
by bill collectors over the telephone. See Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 252
Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969) (five or six calls insufficient to establish a prima
facie case of invasion of privacy); cf Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43.
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supporting the opponent of the motion must be "legally sufficient," to
raise an issue for the jury to consider. "Legally sufficient" has been
defined in various ways, for example "more than a scintilla,"13 or
evidence which goes beyond mere possibility, surmise, or conjecture. 14
Maryland appellate courts have indicated on some occasions that
slight evidence, if "legally sufficient," will overcome a motion for
directed verdict even when there is substantial evidence supporting
the position of the movant. 15 Nevertheless, the expansive language of
the appellate courts in stating the quantum of evidence necessary to
avoid a directed verdict has undoubtedly resulted in the chagrin of
many plaintiffs' (and occasionally defendants') counsel. In truth,
"legally sufficient," which purportedly represents a rather minimal
amount of evidence, is a variable standard that in certain types of
cases requires a rather substantial showing. This article will
consider several types of cases in which Maryland judicial decisions
appear to require an atypically convincing showing by a party with
the burden of proof seeking to get an issue to the jury. These
instances constitute a potentially hazardous trap for the unwary.IS
Although both plaintiffs and defendants may obtain directed verdicts
on issues regardless of whether they bear the burden of proof,17 the
situations discussed in this article all involve plaintiffs resisting
motions for directed verdict on the issue of liability. This, actually, is
the context in which most disputes concerning directed verdicts
arise. For discussion purposes, the cases examined are divided into
288 A.2d 114 (1972) (20-30 calls per week over a five month period held prima
facie case).
13. Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390, 395, 293 A.2d 253, 255 (1972); Trusty v. Wooden,
251 Md. 294, 299, 247 A.2d 382, 385 (1968); Walker v. Hall, 34 Md. App. 571,
582-83, 369 A.2d 105, 113 (1977).
14. Trusty v. Wooden, 251 Md. 294, 299, 247 A.2d 382, 385 (1977); Plitt v.
Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 367, 219 A.2d 237, 243 (1969); Walker v. Hall, 34 Md.
App. 571, 582-83, 369 A.2d 105, 113 (1977).
15. The court of appeals has held that the testimony of one witness, if legally
sufficient, may be the basis for a prima facie case, though it be contradicted by
the testimony of ten others. E.g., Cipriano v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc.,
226 Md. 577, 579, 174 A.2d 583, 584 (1961). Even such a lopsided conflict
should be resolved by the jury. Richardson v. Rice, 256 Md. 19, 25, 259 A.2d
251, 254-55 (1969).
The court of special appeals recently held that even when the plaintiff must
ultimately bear an evidentiary burden greater than a preponderance of the
evidence, as in cases in which fraud is alleged, slight evidence, provided it is
competent, will be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. Fuller v. Horvath, 42
. Md. App. 671, 685, 402 A.2d 134, 142-43 (1979l.
16. The verdict entered under Maryland Rule 552(e) constitutes a final adjudication
of the cause of action. See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 289, 302 (1966).
17. Decisions indicate that it is difficult for a party with the burden of proof to
obtain a directed verdict. A plaintiff with the burden of proof must adduce
"uncontroverted" facts, a concept that will be discussed later in this article in a
different context. Alexander v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464, 470, 30 A.2d 737, 740
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two major areas: (1) cases in which the plaintiff offers direct evidence
in support of the defendant's liability, and (2) cases in which the
plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence to give rise to an inference of
negligence. 18

II. CASES IN WHICH DIRECT EVIDENCE
IS ADDUCED BY THE PLAINTIFF
It is perhaps surprising, in view of the standards for directed
verdict stated previously, that a proponent of a claim or defense
might fail to get the issue to the jury, even though adducing direct,
rather than circumstantial, evidence tending to support that issue. If
such direct evidence is testimonial, then the question would be
particularly suited for a jury because questions of weight and
credibility are uniquely within a jury's province. 19 Nevertheless, in
certain types of cases, direct evidence which would superficially
appear to be "legally sufficient" has not been enough to get an issue
to the jury. Such cases may be divided into two types: cases in which
the evidence supporting liability was overwhelmed by evidence to
the contrary and cases in which the plaintiff's evidence was
insufficient because public policy requires an unusually strong
showing in order to get to the jury.

(1943); C.S. Bowen Co. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 36 Md. App. 26, 33-34, 373
A.2d 30, 35 (1977). See notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra. A defendant,
who bears the burden of proof on the defense of contributory negligence, must
be able to point to a single, decisive act which reasonable people could not
dispute constitutes contributory negligence, in order to obtain a directed
verdict. Clayborne v. Mueller, 266 Md. 30, 35-36, 291 A.2d 443, 446 (1972);
Reiser v. Abramson, 264 Md. 372, 378, 286 A.2d 91, 93 (1972).
This showing required of the defendant can be particularly difficult when
the plaintiff is deceased and thus entitled to a presumption of due care.
Baltimore Transit Co. v. State ex rel. Castranda, 194 Md. 421,434, 71 A.2d.442,
447 (1950); Cluster v. Cole, 21 Md. App. 242, 249, 319 A.2d 320, 325 (1974).
18. The court of appeals has indicated that a case which involves the presentation
of direct evidence is more likely to reach the jury than a case which involves
only "conflicting inferences" based upon circumstantial evidence. Short v.
Wells, 249 Md. 491, 495-97, 240 A.2d 224, 227 (1968). The court cautioned,
however: "This is not to say that in every case where the plaintiff has
introduced some direct evidence of negligence, it should go to the jury. If the
evidence approaches the outer limit of credibility or, in some situations, the
direct evidence is merely adjectival, it would be insufficient." ld. at 497, 240
A.2d at 228.
Not discussed here are libel cases in which, because of constitutional
considerations, the court of special appeals has recently held that the plaintiff
bears a heavy burden in overcoming a directed verdict on the issue of actual
malice. Hohman v. A.S. Abell Co., 44 Md. App. 193, 201, 407 A.2d 794, 798
<19791.
19. E.g., Fisher v. Finan, 163 Md. 418, 420, 163 A. 828, 828 (1933), quoted in
Richardson v. Rice, 256 Md. 19, 25, 259 A.2d 251, 255 (19691.
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A. Cases in Which Plaintiffs Evidence Was Overwhelmed
by Evidence to the Contrary
The Maryland appellate decisions which are the most difficult to
reconcile with the purported liberality in permitting cases to reach
the jury are those in which the plaintiff lost by virtue of a directed
verdict after having adduced evidence from which, standing alone, a
right to recover clearly could have been inferred. Probably the most
troublesome of these cases is Arshack v. Carl M. Freeman Associates,
Inc. 20 In that case, the plaintiff sued the landlord of an apartment
complex on behalf of herself and her minor son who was injured
when he allegedly stepped on a piece of glass embedded in the grass
on the apartment grounds. The son, 11 years old, was admittedly
barefoot when injured. 21 The court did not credit the testimony of the
plaintiff and her son very highly.
The son testified that he was injured as he stepped on a piece of
glass "embedded. . . in the dirt and part of it. . . sticking out of the
dirt."22 He testified that he thought the glass was from a broken
bottle, that it was about four inches high, and that it was "down at
the bottom [of the grass] . . . as if the grass had grown up around
it."23 The landlord's grounds superintendent also testified that "about
ninety percent" of the tenants walked around barefooted in the
summer.24 It appears that from this testimony a reasonable person
might infer that the landlord knew that the presence of sharp objects
hidden in the grass would pose a hazard to tenants and infer that the
shard of glass which allegedly caused the plaintiffs son's injury was
in the grass for a time sufficient to give either actual or constructive
knowledge to the landlord. 25
The Arshack decision apparently turned, however, on a meticulous comparison by the court of the testimony of the plaintiff with
the remainder of the testimony of the defendant's grounds supervisor. The court noted that the plaintiff testified that there was" 'not
only trash and broken glass outside. . . but even in the downstairs
hall'" in her building. 26 The court characterized her testimony
concerning her complaints about the upkeep of the grounds as vague
and noted that she was unable to identify other tenants who had
made complaints, according to her testimony, concerning the upkeep
20. 260 Md. 269, 272 A.2d 30 (1971).
21. [d. at 275,272 A.2d at 33-34. This fact seemed to have concerned the court, but
it apparently was not regarded as evidence of contributory negligence.
22. [d. at 270, 272 A.2d at 31.
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. It would seem that these facts, if found to be true, would constitute a basis of
liability to the tenant. See Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md.
402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964).
26. 260 Md. at 271, 272 A.2d at 31.
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of the premises. 27 The plaintiff further testified that she telephoned
the management about broken glass and trash on the grounds and in
the halls of her building. 28 Although initially the plaintiff could not
remember how soon before her son's injury her complaints occurred,
when pressed by the trial judge, she testified that it was "within a
few weeks" of the injury.29 The plaintiff testified that on the day
following the injury she looked in the area where her son was injured
and found that there was still glass there. 30 She also testified that
she found a piece of glass which she thought was from a broken
bottle. 3l The court noted, however, that "[t]he record leaves in doubt
the question whether she picked up this specific piece of glass; later
she said she did not have it."32 The court also observed that "[i]t is a
pity [the plaintiflJ did not retrieve what she saw. Laboratory tests
might have revealed traces of what might have been [her son's]
blood, establishing it, perhaps, as the piece he did step on."33 The
court stated further, and crucially with regard to the landlord's
notice, that ''[i]t seems quite possible to us that whatever [the
plaintiff's son] stepped on may have been there for seven hours,
seven days, seven months or seven years."34
Perhaps, the plaintiff's evidence in this case did not constitute
the ideal model of a prima facie case. Nevertheless, under the
standard of care which the court of appeals deemed applicable to
landlords,35 the evidence should have constituted a case sufficient to
get past a motion for directed verdict. After all, the record contained
testimony that the plaintiff's son had stepped on a piece of glass, that
the grass in the area had been permitted to grow sufficiently high to
cover the glass, that the plaintiff had seen glass in and about the

27. Id. Such a fastidious analysis of the trial testimony is perhaps inconsistent with
the view taken in an admittedly rather different context in Ackerhalt v.
Hanline Bros., 253 Md. 13, 23-24, 252 A.2d 1, 7 (1969):
[The appellee] has directed our attention to other "inconsistencies" and
"inaccuracies" in [the appellant's] testimony and it must be acknowledged that there are a few, but any lawyer who is much in court knows
that in any case where a witness gives testimony four times, once
without counsel, over a period of 20 months, contradictions, inconsistencies and iriaccuracies are bound to creep into the record. Indeed any
witness who repeats testimony verbatim four times hand running is
suspected of testifying by rote.
28. 260 Md. at 271, 272 A.2d at 31.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 271-72, 272 A.2d at 31.
31. Id. at 271-72, 272 A.2d at 31-32.
32. Id. at 272, 272 A.2d at 32.
33. [d. at 274, 272 A.2d at 33.
34. [d.
35. [d. The court cited Windsor v. Goldscheider. 248 Md. 220. 236 A.2d 16119671.
Langley Park Apts .. Sec. H .. Inc. v. Lund. 234 Md. 402. 199 A.2d 620 1HJ64).
and Landay v. Cohn. 220 Md. 24. 150 A.2d 739 11959).
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building in the past and had complained about it to agents of the
landlord, and that she had found a piece of glass in the general area
where her son was injured on the day after his injury. Clearly, the
testimony contained some equivocations and uncertainties. These
problems are for the jury to consider in measuring the weight to
accord the testimony. In ruling on this motion the province of the
trial and appellate courts36 is to draw all reasonable inferences
against the party moving for a directed verdict.
The court of appeals affirmed the directed verdict for the
defendant in Arshack because the plaintiffs evidence did not rise
"above the level of surmise, possibility or conjecture" that her son's
injury resulted from the negligence of the landlord. 37 The court so
held, not because of insufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence standing
alone, but because of testimony adduced by the defendant, which
both the trial court and court of appeals regarded as presenting the
uncontroverted and inherently probable facts. 3s
The testimony of the defendant's grounds supervisor clearly
tended to refute inferences favorable to the plaintiff. He testified that
he and a crew of men worked every weekday to keep the apartment
complex "spic and span."39 In addition to the morning pickups by his
crew, the supervisor testified, building custodians were required to
"police" the grounds twice a day to be sure that all trash was picked
Up.40 The supervisor testified that the grass was cut once a week and
that the area surrounding the plaintiffs building "got a little more
attention" from his crew because prospective tenants came there for
information and to look at model apartments. He testified that he got
very few complaints from tenants about the condition of the grounds.
Concerning the presence of glass on the grounds, the supervisor
stated that glass was found occasionally after "the trash people had
emptied the incinerators" and that his crews had a special duty to
clean up after the incinerators were emptied. 41 In addition, the
supervisor indicated that three days after the plaintiffs son was
injured, he could find no glass in the yard area where the injury
occurred.
The court of appeals was not required to reach the issue of
whether the plaintiffs evidence, standing alone, would have been

36. The standards for reviewing evidence when considering the propriety of
granting a motion for directed verdict are the same at the appellate level as at
the trial level. See Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc. v. Babbington, 264 Md.
724, 728, 288 A.2d 131, 133-34 (1972) (setting the standard applicable to
appellate review under Md. Rule 552).
37. 260 Md. at 278, 272 A.2d at 35.
38: [d.
39. [d. at 272, 272 A.2d at 32.
40. [d.
41. [d. at 272-73, 272 A.2d at 32.
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sufficient to overcome a motion for directed verdict.42 The court held
that the defendant's evidence was sufficient to place the defendant
"well within the bounds of the required ordinary care and diligence"
because "[i]t was neither contradicted nor controverted and its
presence requires a reappraisal of the inferences which might
otherwise be drawn properly and legitimately from the testimony of
the appellant which, it may be observed, is more remarkable for
what it does not prove than for what it does prove."43 The court's
action could hardly be characterized as a mere reappraisal. The
court's opinion resolved the conflicts against the plaintiff in a
withering refutation of her testimony that does not sound entirely
unlike what one would expect to hear in the course of jury
deliberations. 44
While the established tests for reviewing a motion for directed
verdict generally indicate that only evidence supporting the opponent of the motion be considered, the court in Arshack, in weighing
the reasonableness of inferences favoring the plaintiff from her own
evidence in light of the defendant's evidence, applied a wellestablished principle, viz., that evidence supporting the movant may
be considered if it establishes uncontroverted facts. 45 Applying this
principle in Arshack, the court determined that the jury could not
reasonably infer negligence from the plaintiff's evidence because of
the uncontraverted facts tending to show due care.
42. Defendant's counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs
case. The trial judge reserved his ruling on the motion, but the defendant was
deemed to have waived it by offering evidence. See Md. Rule 552(b). The sole
basis for the granting of the motion at that point in the trial would have been
the plaintiffs evidence.
43. 260 Md. at 274, 272 A.2d at 33.
44.
[S]erving to dissipate any such inference [of want of ordinary care] is
[the grounds supervisor's] description of the daily routine of his work
force . . . . Nor does [the plaintiffs] testimony in respect of "bits of
trash and glass" in the area in general provide a source for a proper and
legitimate deduction that there was a want of ordinary care and
diligence on the part of the defendant. She did not say precisely where
she saw the "bits of trash or glass" or precisely where she saw them
. . . . Considering her statement in the light of the grounds supervisor's testimony one is obliged to conclude that if she did see any trash
or glass, Alston's men must have seen it, since they were looking for it,
and that if they saw it they picked it up.
260 Md. at 275, 272 A.2d at 33.
45. See Dunstan v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 187 Md. 571, 51 A.2d 288 (1947);
Alexander v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464, 469-70, 30 A.2d 737, 739-40 (1943).
With respect to this principle in the federal courts the Supreme Court held
in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949):
It is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is
evidence to submit an issue to a jury we need look only to the evidence
and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant
against whom a peremptory instruction has been given.
Wilkerson was decided in the context of a case under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), and the federal appellate courts have
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The plaintiff in Arshack apparently made no attempt, in
rebuttal, to refute the evidence, or "facts," adduced in the defendant's
case. The court of appeals has made it clear that failure to contradict
evidence supporting the movant for directed verdict is not necessarily fatal; the evidence still might be disbelieved by the jury.46 If,
however, the truth of the evidence or facts supporting the movant
may not be disputed, then such facts are uncontroverted47 and the
issue is decided against the opponent of the motion as a matter of
law.
It is a difficult matter to determine when the evidence offered by
a movant for directed verdict overwhelms the evidence of the
opponent so as to create merely an issue of law. It is equally difficult
to determine when, whether or not any effort is made to refute or
contradict it, such evidence creates a fact question to be resolved by
the jury. As the court of appeals held in Dunstan v. Bethlehem Steel
Co.: "In some of the many cases involving this distinction it may be
difficult to reconcile the application of the principle to the facts, but
the principle is beyond question."48
A thorough consideration of the evidence in Arshack indicates
strongly that the case should have been submitted to the jury. The
"facts" adduced by the defendant were uncontradicted rather than
uncontraverted or uncontrovertible. The plaintiff and her son
testified that there was glass on the lawn; the defendant testified
that there was not and probably could not have been because of his
maintenance procedures. The plaintiff's son testified that the grass
was so high as to cover foreign objects in it; the defendant, however,
testified that it was regularly cut. It is difficult to imagine a clearer
conflict for resolution by a jury. If the equivocations of the testimony
supporting the plaintiff tended to diminish the probability of
tended to limit its effect to cases under that Act. 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 50.02[1] (rev. 2d ed. 1980). Some federal courts
have taken a position similar to Maryland's, i.e., that uncontradicted facts
supporting the movant for directed verdict may be considered in disposing of
the motion. See, e.g., Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970). See also 9
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2529 (1971).
46. Lehman v. Baltimore Transit Co., 227 Md. 537, 540-41, 177 A.2d 855, 857
(1962); Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 405, i 74 A.2d 53, 55 (1961); Alexander
v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464, 468, 30 A.2d 737, 739 (1943). Tingle distinguishes
between situations where the evidence mustered in favor of a directed verdict is
"practically uncontradicted," in which cases the motion should be denied, and
those in which facts that would support the motion are "uncontested or
admitted." In the latter type, the motion may be granted on the basis of such
facts. [d.
47. Language in Dunstan, indicating that a directed verdict may be granted when
"the facts are undisputed, and the permissible inferences indisputable,"
indicates that "uncontrovertible" might be a more useful term than uncontroverted because the latter appears almost synonomous with uncontradicted.
187 Md. at 577-78, 51 A.2d at 291.
48. 187 Md. at 578, 51 A.2d at 291.
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inferences from the evidence favoring the plaintiff,49 clearly the
potentially self-serving character of the testimony of the defendant's
witness, apparently not considered by the court, should have been
considered by a jury. 50
Arshack, whether or not a proper application of the principle
that uncontroverted facts may overcome the direct evidence of the
opponent of a directed verdict, stands as a powerful warning to
counsel, particularly to plaintiffs' counsel. Testimonial evidence,
even when it appears to support quite positively an inference of legal
liability, is not always sufficient to get a case or issue to the jury. It
may be overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary for purposes of a
directed verdict. 51
How far a party must go to attempt to refute evidence
supporting the movant for directed verdict is not clear. Nevertheless,
counsel must evaluate the probable evidence of opponents not only in
terms of ultimately meeting the burden of proof, but also with
reference to overcoming a motion for directed verdict.

B. Cases in Which Public Policy Places an Unusually Heavy
Burden upon the Plaintiff in Getting to the Jury
A review of Maryland appellate decisions indicates that there
are a few types of cases in which the plaintiff must make an
unusually heavy showing on the issue of liability in order to get past
a motion for directed verdict. This showing is necessary even when
the plaintiffs evidence of liability is direct. Three such types of cases
are "slip and fall" negligence actions against stores, negligence
actions against the so-called "favored" driver involving the Boule-

49. The court of appeals has recognized that the testimony of a witness may be so
self-contradictory that it has no probative force and, thus, cannot be made the
basis of a jury verdict. Olney v. Carmichael, 202 Md. 226, 232, 96 A.2d 37, 39
(1953); Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 537, 59 A.2d 313,
318 (1958). This basis for a motion for directed verdict may be a problem for the
proponent of an issue relying on the testimony of a young child. See, e.g.,
Lenehan v. Nicholson, 214 Md. 414, 135 A.2d 447 (1957).
50. See, e.g., Plitt v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 367-68, 219 A.2d 237, 243 (1966>The plaintiff in Plitt, suing for unjust enrichment, was required to prove that a
check he issued to a third party (later bankrupt) and then endorsed to the
defendant was received by the defendant without consideration paid to the
third party by the defendant. The defendant testified that certain debits on his
checking account statement represented checks issued to the third party. The
plaintiff could not contradict this evidence and the trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant on that basis. In reversing the trial court's action, the court of
appeals held that the jury could determine that the defendant's testimony was
entitled to little weight. 242 Md. at 270, 219 A.2d at 245.
51. See Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 213 A.2d 549 (1964); Kaplan v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 207 Md. 56, 113 A.2d 415 (1955); Brock v. Sorrell, 15 Md. App. 1. 288
A.2d 640 (1972).
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vard Rule,s2 and medical malpractice actions. 53 Only the first two will
be discussed here.
1. "Slip and Fall" Suits

It is not surprising that modern supermarkets and department
stores are involved in a great deal of personal injury litigation.
Shoppers scurrying through narrow lanes between well stocked
shelves inevitably cause slippery substances to fall to the floor.
Occasionally, these mishaps occur too frequently to be picked up
immediately. Even though the unfortunate shopper injured in a slip
and fall accident is typically not responsible for the presence of a
slippery substance on the floor, neither, typically, is the storeowner.
Undoubtedly with these circumstances in mind, the court of appeals
has defined the stringent burden the plaintiff must bear in getting
such a case to the jury:
In an action by a customer to recover damages resulting
from a fall in a store caused by a foreign substance on the
floor or stairway, the burden is on the customer to produce
evidence that the storekeeper created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive knowledge of its existence.
The burden is not met if it appears that the injuries resulted

52. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-403 (1977). See generally Comment, The Maryland
Boulevard Rule: A Time for Change, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 223 (1977).
53. In medical malpractice actions, a prima facie case requires a showing that
makes out a lack of the requisite care on the part of the defendant doctor, and
that want of such care was the cause of the injury. See Riley v. United States,
248 F. Supp. 95 (D. Md. 1954). This requirement has proved burdensome. E.g.,
Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d 595 (1969) (doctor
admitted breaking a needle in the patient while attempting to suture at the
wrong angle, and then sewing up the patient with the needle in the body, but
nonetheless won a directed verdict on appeal); Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390,
293 A.2d 253 (1972). These evidentiary rigors appear to have been lessened
somewhat by a recognition that lay evidence may be sufficient to demonstrate
want of due care in uncomplicated cases. E.g., Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84,
97-99, 288 A.2d 379, 387-88 (1972). Likewise, the demise of the so-called
"strict locality" rule may have had the same effect. Shilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975). See 37 MD. L. REV.
212 (1977).
All of this must be viewed, however, in light of Maryland's Health Care
Malpractice Claims Act. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-Ol to
3-2A-09 (1980). The Act provides in essence that all actions involving medical
malpractice claims in an excess of $5,000.00 are merely a review of awards
under the Act's binding arbitration provision. Arbitration awards under the Act
are presumed to be correct, Id. § 3-2A-06(d), but this does not change the
plaintiffs burden of proof if he is the party seeking review. Attorney General v.
Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 293-94, 385 A.2d 37, 68-69 (1978). On the other hand,
when the claimant, erstwhile plaintiff in a civil action, is successful in
arbitration, the Act may be viewed as lessening the procedural hazards of
recovery. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice
Mediation Panels: A Maryland Perspective, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 75, 92-97 (1979).
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either from the defendant's negligence or from some independent cause, for the existence of which the defendant is
not responsible, unless the plaintiff excludes the independent cause as the proximate cause of the injuries. 54
A review of the decisions involving these injuries indicates how
difficult it has been for plaintiffs' counsel to meet this burden. For
purposes of ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the courts have
been willing to assume the presence of the foreign substance, but
regard any inference that the defendant might have been responsible
as conjecture and surmise, the latter inference being crucial to
liability.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hariston 55 the plaintiff fell and
broke her leg on a flight of stairs in the defendant's store. She
testified that after she fell she saw an "oily, greenish, grayish
substance" in which her heel left a mark. The defendant demonstrated that no oily or greasy articles were sold in the store. In
addition, the defendant produced testimony that the store had been
thoroughly cleaned the previous night and dry mopped on the
morning of the plaintiffs injury. The plaintiff won a jury verdict, but
the court of appeals reversed the trial judge's failure to grant the
defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Although the court of appeals assumed the presence of the substance
on the floor for purposes of the motion, it determined that "the
evidence does not support an inference that the foreign substance
was placed there by the employees of the defendant, that its presence
was known to them, or that it was there for an appreciable time
before the accident."56 It is not surprising, in view of the large
number of people - all potential culprits - who pass anonymously
through large department stores or supermarkets that plaintiffs
have sometimes been unable to carry the burden of getting such "slip
and fall" cases to the jury because of the effectiveness of the
defendant's self-serving testimony regarding meticulous cleanup
procedures. 57

54. Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 119-20 113 A.2d 405 408
(955).
"
55. 196 Md. 595, 78 A.2d 190 (1951).
56. Id. at 598, 78 A.2d at 191. Cf Link v. Hutzler Bros., 25 Md. App. 586, 335 A.2d
192 (975) (the plaintiff allegedly slipped on built up floor wax; defendant's
admitted use of floor wax four months before the occurrence and of a polymer
finish three weeks before constituted a sufficient connection to the alleged
cause of the plaintiffs injury to permit the issue to go to the jury).
57. E.g., Moulden v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 239 Md. 229,210 A.2d 724
(965); Lexington Market Auth. v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 197 A.2d 147 (1964);
Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 113 A.2d 405 (955).
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The recent decision of the court of special appeals in Keene v.
Arlan's Department Store,58 while presenting an instance of a
plaintiff reaching the jury in such a slip and fall case, only
underscores the difficulty that plaintiff's counsel usually encounters
in such cases. In Keene, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped in
what she testified was a puddle of a very slippery, slimy substance.
The alleged puddle was near a display containing shampoo. There
was no direct evidence, however, that the substance on the floor
actually was shampoo.59 The plaintiff in Keene was able to present
other evidence indicating the legal responsibility of the storekeeper
for the presence of the foreign substance. The plaintiff testified that
after her fall she heard a nearby cashier exclaim that "I told them if
this wasn't cleaned up, someone's going to fall."60 The court of special
appeals, determining this statement to be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule, reversed the trial court's direction of a verdict for
the defendant on the basis that:
[i]f the testimony of the appellants concerning the cashier's
statement was believed by the jury, it could have raised an
inference that the cashier, an agent of the owner of the
premises, had knowledge of the dangerous condition and had
relayed that information to "them." It was for the jury to
determine who "them" referred to and to test the weight of
the evidence in reaching its conclusion as to whether the
[plaintiffs] had met their burden of proof. 6!
The cashier's excited utterance raised a jury question of whether the
defendant was responsible for the substance on the floor without the
jury having to engage in undue speculation, surmise or conjecture.
The success of the plaintiff in Keene in getting to the jury, however,
does not indicate any lessening of the burden on plaintiffs. It seems
unlikely that most plaintiffs will possess such evidence. The public
policy of Maryland appears to favor strongly protecting merchants
from becoming the insurers of their customers by making it
relatively difficult for plaintiffs to get "slip and fall" cases to juries.
2.

Cases Involving the Boulevard Rule

Maryland's Boulevard Rule,62 which is designed to facilitate the
flow of traffic on through highways and streets by virtually
58. 35 Md. App. 250, 370 A.2d 124 (1977).
59. [d. at 252, 370 A.2d at 126.
60. [d.
61. [d. at 257, 370 A.2d at 128. It may be argued that the statement of the cashier

is not imputable to the owner of the store. Grzboski v. Bernheimer-Leader
Stores, 156 Md. 146, 143 A.2d 706 (1928).
62. See note 52 supra.
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insulating motorists proceeding on roadways from liability in
collisions with motorists entering roadways, has been the subject of a
significant amount of automobile negligence litigation in Maryland.
Under the terminology generally used in this type of litigation, the
"favored" driver is the motorist on the boulevard. In litigation in
which the favored driver has been the defendant, the Boulevard Rule
has placed a nearly insurmountable burden on the plaintiff, whether
an "unfavored" driver or a passenger.63 For the most part, the
unfavored driver remains a pariah, unable to overcome a directed
verdict because of presumed contributory negligence. 64 In cases
involving suits by passengers against the favored driver, on the other
hand, there appears to have been an easing of the requirement that
the plaintiff adduce evidence of the driver's inattention in order to
survive a motion for directed verdict. The plaintiff succeeded in this
manner in both Kopitzki v. Boyd65 and Dean v. Redmiles. 66

63. Such plaintiffs have been able to survive motions for directed verdict only in
cases involving last clear chance, e.g., Greenfield v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d
888 (1939), or in certain "rare cases" (a term of art) in which there is sufficient
evidence that the accident may have been caused by the inattention of the
favored driver, e.g., Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961).
64. More than a decade ago, the acceptability of this state of affairs was questioned
in a thought provoking article. Webb, Bothersome Boulevards, 26 MD. L. REV.
III (1966).
65. 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976).
66. 280 Md. 137,374 A.2d 329 (1977). Kopitzki and Dean are thoroughly discussed
in Comment, Developments in .the Boulevard Rule: Expanded Liability for the
Favored Driver, 37 MD. L. REV. 171 (1977). Both cases are considered herein
only in that they represent a departure from the heavy burden on plaintiffs
suing favored drivers to get past a directed verdict motion by the defendant.
In a somewhat different context, in reversing the grant by the trial judge of
a motion for summary judgment under Maryland Rule 610, the court of special
appeals in Gazvoda v. McCaslin; 36 Md. App. 604, 375 A.2d 570 (1977),
apparently has provided an added basis for the unfavored driver to avoid a
directed verdict in a boulevard case. In Gazvoda, the unfavored vehicle, a
bicycle, turned left into the southbound lane ·of a favored roadway. When he had
completed his turn he collided into a vehicle proceeding north in the unfavored
plaintiffs southbound lane. Following the court of appeals decision in
Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md. 322, 373 A.2d 624 (1977), the court of special
appeals determined that the vehicle in the wrong lane of the favored roadway,
because he was not proceeding in a lawful manner, see MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 21-101(0) (1977), was not entitled to preference over the vehicle entering
from the un favored roadway. Gazvoda, 36 Md. App. at 612, 375 A.2d at 575.
Cf, Dail v. Tri-City Trucking Co., 39 Md. App. 430, 387 A.2d 430 (1978>.
While Gazvoda and Covington did not involve review of a directed verdict, it
would appear that evidence that a driver on a favored roadway is proceeding
unlawfully should create a jury question as to whether the protection of the
Boulevard Rule is available to such a driver.
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Prior to Kopitzki and Dean, the Maryland courts refused to
permit evidence of speeding by the favored driver to serve as the sole
basis of negligence. 67 The court in Kopitzki, while stating that the
evidence would permit a jury to find that the favored driver's
inattention caused the accident, noted that the defendant's speed was
nearly twice the posted limit. Thus, determining whether the speed
of the favored driver was a proximate cause of the passenger's injury
would not require "nice calculations of speed, time or distance."68
Likewise, Dean was an action by the passenger in the favored
car against the driver of that car. The court was more direct as to
whether evidence of the speed of the favored driver alone is sufficient
to overcome a motion for directed verdict by the favored driver. The
Dean court observed that "if the evidence before the court is
sufficient to support a conclusion that the speed of the favored driver
was the proximate cause of the accident, then this becomes a jury
question."69
Thus, when the unfavored driver sues the favored driver in a
Boulevard Rule case, the strong public policy of Maryland nearly
always compels a directed verdict for the favored driver. The force of
this policy, however, has been weakened in cases involving suits by
the passengers of the favored driver.
III.

CASES IN WHICH ONLY CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IS ADDUCED BY
THE PLAINTIFF

A plaintiff who cannot prove exactly how an injury-causing
occurrence happened may get past a defendant's motion for directed
verdict by relying on inferences of liability arising from proved
circumstances. This was demonstrated recently in Todd v. Weikle,70 a
case involving the crash of a small plane and the resulting death of
all of its occupants. The plaintiffs were the widower and son of the
pilot trainee. Because everyone aboard the plane was killed, the
plaintiffs could not prove directly whether their decedent or the
defendant was at the controls when the crash occurred. 71 The

67. See, e.g., Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964); Harper v. Higgs, 225
Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961).
68. Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. at 495-96, 204 A.2d at 530.
69. 280 Md. at 161, 374 A.2d at 342.
70. 36 Md. App. 663, 376 A.2d 104 (1977).
71. The court held that the plaintiff had to produce probative evidence that the
defendant was at the controls in order to recover. Id. at 669-70, 376 A.2d at
108.
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particular facts in Todd presented a strong circumstantial showing
that the defendant was actually in control of the plane at the critical
time.72 It might easily be contended that any other inference under
the circumstances would have been implausible. In cases when the
circumstances surrounding the occurrence are more equivocal, as
where they plausibly point to more than one set of facts, the plaintiff
must make a stronger showing to get to a jury. 73 Whether or not the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur74 is involved, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that inferences which favor the plaintiff are more
plausible than those which do not. 75 The showing that a plaintiff
must make before a case solely involving circumstantial evidence
may go to the jury is somewhat akin to the burden of proof that a
plaintiff with direct evidence of liability must bear once the case has
reached the jury. It is, in essence, a preliminary burden of proof. An
unwary plaintiff, in offering evidence demonstrating the probability
of the inference of the defendant's liability, may inteIject alternative
causes into the case. These explanations may actually decrease the
probability of the inferences favoring defendant's liability.
The difficulty that a plaintiff may face in relying on inferences
from proved circumstances was demonstrated long ago in County
Commissioners of Harford County v. Wise. 76 The plaintiff in Wise

72. The circumstances proved included the following: the defendant occupied the
left front seat on takeoff customarily occupied by the pilot; an air traffic
controller had conversed with a male prior to the crash; the defendant had
substantial flying experience while the plaintiffs' decedent had little; conditions
required instrument flying and instruments were located only in front of the
defendant's seat; and there was no evidence that plaintiffs' decedent had
changed seats, that the defendant had suddenly become ill, or that the
plaintiffs' decedent had seized the controls in panic. Id. at 671-72,374 A.2d at
109.
73. Short v. Wells, 249 Md. 491, 495, 240 A.2d 224, 226 (1968).
74. The requirements of res ipsa loquitur are that the plaintiff must show he was
injured "(a) by a casualty of a sort which usually does not occur in the absence
of negligence, (b) by an instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive
control, (c) under circumstances indicating that it was not caused by any
involuntary act or neglect of the plaintiff." Munzert v. American Stores Co., 232
Md. 97, 104, 192 A.2d 59, 63 (1963) (citing Proctor Elec. Co. v. Zink, 217 Md.
22, 141 A.2d 721 (1958».
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D, Comment b at 157 (1965) indicates: "A
res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one kind of case of circumstantial
evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer both negligence and causation
from the mere occurrence of the event and the defendant's relation to it." While
res ipsa loquitur relieves the plaintiff of the requirement of demonstrating
specific acts of negligence, it must appear from the plaintiffs case that
negligence is more probable than any other explanation for the occurrence. Id.,
Comment e at 159. See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 39 at 211-14 (4th ed.
1971).
76. 75 Md. 38, 23 A. 65 (1891).

234

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 9

owned a mill-dam which was washed away during a flood. Prior to
this occurrence several ties of the dam were cut in removing a
railroad trestle which had been carried downstream and lodged
against the dam. The plaintiffs declaration contained two counts,
one regarding the defendant's cutting of the ties on the dam and the
other alleging negligent construction of a bridge upstream that made
the flow of water more forceful during periods of high water.77 At
trial, however, there was no evidence connecting the defendant to the
cutting of the timbers on the dam, nor was there evidence that the
construction of the bridge was the cause of the damage. The court of
appeals, in nonsuiting the plaintiff, clearly indicated that the
plaintiffs critical shortcoming was her failure to demonstrate that
the set of facts that would impose liability on the defendant, the
alleged negligent construction of the bridge, was more probable than
the alternative explanation she had interjected into the case, the
cutting of the timbers. The court stressed that a finding against the
defendant would require ignoring the exculpatory evidence. 78
If a jury had weighed the evidence in the same manner as the
court of appeals, the plaintiff undoubtedly would have lost. 79 The
court of appeals held that the case should never have reached the
jury because the plaintiff did not sufficiently refute, with evidence
supporting the inference favorable to her, an alternative explanation
that tended to exonerate the defendant. The court indicated that the
plaintiffs scatter-gun approach to proving liability was her undoing:
[H]ad the plaintiff confined her case to the second count, and
had the defendants relied by way of defence upon the facts
which tended to show that the injury resulted from the
cutting of the ties of the dam, it would have been the
province of the jury to determine which of those two opposite
causes, the one asserted by the plaintiff, or the other relied
on by the defendants, produced t.he damage. so
The plaintiff in Wise thus proved both too much and too little to get
to a jury.
Another old case which starkly demonstrates the difficulty with
circumstantial evidence is Strasburger v. Vogel. 81 The plaintiff was
injured by a brick falling from the chimney of. the defendant's
building. The court noted that the plaintiff could have relied on an

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

[d. at 39-40, 23 A. at 65.
[d. at 42-43, 23 A. at 66.
Actually, the plaintiff below won a jury verdict against the defendant.
75 Md. at 43, 23 A. at 66.
103 Md. 85, 63 A. 202 (1906),
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inference of negligence from the falling of the brick itself.82
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, some of his own witnesses
testified that unidentified men were standing on the defendant's roof
and leaning on the chimney prior to the plaintiffs injury. In view of
that evidence, which was corroborated by a defense witness, the
court of appeals held that it was error for the trial court to submit
the case to the jury. The court noted that if the plaintiff had relied
solely on the inference of negligence arising from the falling bricks
and the defendant had relied on the intervention of an independent
agency, the case would have been proper to submit to the jury.83
The Wise and Strasburger cases are not simply dusty curios.
Both cases illustrate the hazards faced by a plaintiffs counsel
building a case on inferences from proved circumstances. Where the
inference of negligence is available on the basis of res ipsa loquitur,
it may be lost in an attempt by the plaintiff to. prove that the
inference of defendant's negligence is more probable than other
inferences concerning the cause of the injury. Yet, while efforts to
exclude other causes may be risky in cases involving res ipsa
loquitur, failure to make such attempts under some circumstances
may result in a directed verdict for the defendant.

A. Cases in Which Res Ipsa Loquitur Is Not Available
Plaintiffs in negligence cases may not rely on the inference of
negligence arising from an occurrence unless the defendant had
exclusive control over the instrumentality which caused the injuryM
or the premises where the injury occurred,85 and unless no action by
the plaintiff, or an intervening force, could just as probably have
caused the injury. 86
A review of more recent decisions involving attempted proof of
negligence by circumstantial evidence indicates the presence of the
"preliminary" burden of proof, referred to above, which a plaintiff
must meet in order to get a case to the jury. One of the most graphic
examples is Peterson v. Underwood,87 a wrongful death action arising

82. Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts the court noted: "[If] the
chimney was in a condition of repair and if no independent agency intervened,
the bricks would not have fallen; and if no other fact had appeared in the case
reflecting upon or accounting for their falling, the mere fact that they fell was a
sufficient circumstance from which a jury might have fairly concluded that
their fall was due to a failure on the part of the defendant to keep the chimney
in proper repair; and such a failure would be negligence." [d. at 90, 63 A. at
203-04.
83. [d. at 91, 63 A. at 204.
84. E.g., Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971).
85. Lee v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A.2d 832 (1954).
86. Munzert v. American Stores Co., 232 Md. 97, 105-06, 192 A.2d 59, 63-64
(1963).
87. 258 Md. 9, 264 A.2d 851 (1970).
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out of the defendant property owner's negligence. The plaintiffs son,
aged five, was killed when a wall at the rear boundary of the
defendant's property collapsed upon him. The plaintiff was unable to
rely on res ipsa loquitur because the defendant did not have control
over the premises; they had been leased several years earlier to the
decedent's aunt and uncle. 88 The plaintiff was also unable to rely on
res ipsa loquitur because she attempted to establish specific grounds
of negligence. 89 There was no testimony or other evidence on how the
accident occurred. The plaintiffs case was based on the defendants'
alleged negligent construction and failure to inspect and repair the
wall. There was testimony by a neighbor that the wall was of shoddy
construction and that it contained cracks and leaned inward. There
was also testimony that a clothesline polE( had been placed in the
wall, apparently in the hollow cells of the 'concrete blocks, and that
children used the clothesline for a swing.
In Peterson, the plaintiff introduced evidence and produced an
expert who testified that the wall had not been constructed in
compliance with the Baltimore City Code. The evidence indicated
that the wall had been built at a slight angle and that the clothesline
poles added lateral pressure. 90 At trial, the plaintiff obtained a
verdict against both defendants but the trial judge granted a
judgment n.o.v. for the defendant prior owner.91 In reversing the
entry of judgment against the second defendant the court of appeals
held:
We think plaintiffs proof was clearly sufficient to allow the
jury to find that [the prior owner] negligently constructed
the . . . wall, and that [the child's] death was the result of
the collapse of that wall. What we find to be a fatal defect in
[the plaintiffs] case is lack of any evidence causally linking
defendants' negligence to the injury suffered. Such a defect is
described as a failure to prove that defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. 92
The court of appeals, while noting that proof by inference is not
"inherently insufficient,"93 held in Peterson that the passage of time
between the construction of the wall and its collapse - four and a
half years during which it stood stable and in apparently unchanged
condition - rendered the link between the defendant's conduct and
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 19-20, 264 A.2d at 856.
Id. at 19-20, 264 A.2d at 857.
Id. at 14, 264 A.2d at 853-54.
The wall was built at the behest of Norman Peterson, owner of the premises in
1959. In that same year Norman sold the property to his mother, Christine,
who owned the premises at the tiine of the occurrence. Judgment n.o.v. was
granted in favor of Norman. Id. at 12-13, 264 A.2d at 853.
92. Id. at 15, 264 A.2d at 854.
93. Id. at 17, 264 A.2d at 855.
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the collapse too remote for the jury to consider.94 The court stated
that a plaintiff may get to the jury by producing legally sufficient
proof, specifically proof showing that it is more probable than not
that defendant's act caused his injury.95 Because of the passage of
time, it could not be said that the child's death resulted, more
probably than not, from the defendant's conduct.
While the Peterson court indicated that the plaintiffs failure was
in not establishing the cause of the collapse of the wa1l 96 rather than
in failing to negate or refute alternative causes of the injury, it
criticized the plaintiffs use of expert testimony that discounted the
role of children pulling on the clothesline as an alternative cause.
The court held that this testimony "left the jury with no data with
which they could evaluate how 'substantial a factor' the original
negligent construction was in causing the later injury."97 It is
paradoxical that evidence which served to negate a very obvious
alternative explanation of the occurrence that would tend to
exonerate the defendant, could serve to make the jury's task in
considering negligence more difficult. The court apparently assumed
that, if there had been testimony that children playing could have
pulled the wall down, the jury could more appropriately have
evaluated whether the construction and maintenance of the wall had
anything to do with its collapse. It is apparent from the court's
opinion that expert testimony to the effect that the defendant's
conduct caused the collapse might have been sufficient to get the
case to the jury. 98
Peterson is troublesome in view of Maryland's expressed policy
concerning directed verdicts. The plaintiff was unable to get to a jury
although her testimony indicated that a wall did not meet applicable
construction safety standards when constructed and that it leaned in
the direction in which it ultimately fell. There are decisions,
including that of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in
Rafferty v. Weimer,99 in which the burden on the plaintiff relying on
circumstantial evidence does not appear to be as heavy as that in
Peterson.
Otis Elevator Co. v. LePore,lOo a case which antedated Peterson, is
difficult to reconcile with Peterson. Otis Elevator involved a suit
against a department store and the company that serviced, maintained, and inspected the store's escalator and arose out of the
94. Id. at 19, 264 A.2d at 856.
95. Id. at 17, 264 A.2d at 855.
96. Id. at 18-19, 264 A.2d at 856.
97. Id. at 18, 264 A.2d at 856.

98. Id. at 17, 264 A.2d at 855.
99. 36 Md. App. 98, 373 A.2d 64 (1977). See also note 105 and accompanying text
infra.
100. 229 Md. 52, 181 A.2d (19621.
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amputation of part of the foot of the plaintiffs three-year old son on
the escalator. Only Otis Elevator appealed the judgment entered on a
$70,000 verdict for the plaintiff.
There was no direct testimony in Otis Elevator as to exactly how
the plaintiffs son was injured. While descending the escalator on the
step below his father, the child's foot became caught in an unknown
manner. His foot was not released until he reached the bottom of the
escalator. The plaintiff produced testimony that the clearance space
on both sides of the escalator between the steps and side panels was
twice the maximum width approved by the National Bureau of
Standards, the American Institute of Architects, and the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.lOl The plaintiff argued that the
child's foot had been caught in this abnormally wide clearance space.
The court characterized the defendant's position in Otis Elevator as
an argument that "even if it be assumed that the large clearance
between the step and the skirt panel amounted to negligence, [the
defendant] cannot be held liable for such negligence unless the
plaintiff showed that said negligence proximately caused the injuries
complained 0["102 Although the Otis Elevator court pointed out that
the plaintiff need not establish causation to an absolute certainty,
the court stated:
It would serve no useful purpose to set forth all of the
plaintiffs testimony in minute detail. Suffice it to say that
there was ample circumstantial evidence to support a
rational inference by the triers of fact that the child's foot
was caught and injured in the clearance between the step
and the side skirt panel. lOa

Although the cases involving directed verdicts must turn on
their particular facts,104 it is difficult to reconcile why the chain of
circumstances was too remote to tie the construction and maintenance of the wall to the defendant in Peterson while the link between
the escalator defect and the injury was not too remote in Otis
Elevator. Counsel should be aware, however, that in both cases the
plaintiffs were required to show that their inferences were more
probable than inferences to the contrary.
The recent decision in Rafferty v. Weimer l ";; provides guidance in
how to get these cases to a jury. Rafferty involved a suit on behalf of
Rafferty, who was allegedly injured when his car, which was parked

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

[d. at 55-56, 181 A.2d at 66l.
[d. at 57. 181 A.2d at 662.
[d.

Beahm v. Shortall. 279 Md. 321. 368 A.2d 1005 119771.
36 Md. App. 98, 373 A.2d 64 119771.
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on the side of the road and protruded two feet into the right lane of
an interstate highway, was sideswiped by a truck in the right lane of
the highway. The plaintiff, a cerebral cripple as a result of the
accident, was unable to communicate sufficiently to testify at the
trial. The plaintiff alleged that Rafferty was standing at the front of
his automobile when it was struck by the defendant's vehicle, and
that the impact of the collision threw him to a nearby grassy plot
where he was found. The plaintiff offered testimony indicating the
presence of grease stains on the hood and blood on the guardrail at
the front of Rafferty's car. A medical witness testified "that
Rafferty's injuries were caused by a vehicular accident."106
There was no direct evidence in Rafferty indicating that the
accident occurred as the plaintiff contended. The court, citing both
Peterson and LePore, however, noted that proof of causation need not
amount to direct and positive proof to an absolute certainty. Wi The
defendants, who obtained a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
contended on appeal that because the skid marks made by Rafferty's
vehicle when it was hit were only six inches long and perpendicular
to the car, which indicated lateral movement, the vehicle's movement
could not possibly have thrown him a distance of twenty feet. The
court determined that "skid marks without more, are not conclusive
as to movement."IOB The court noted further:
The absence of forward skid marks merely suggests that the
tires on the Rafferty vehicle were pointed straight ahead
without application of the brakes. Consequently, at the
moment of impact there was no resistance or friction to
cause forward skid marks. Any other conclusion under the
physical facts here would, in our opinion, be contrary to
common knowledge and experience if not contrary to
scientific principles. 109
The court's conclusion is not surprising. It likely assumed that in
a high speed sideswipe collision the plaintiff's vehicle would have to
move significantly, a fact essential to the plaintiff's theory. Certainly
the physical evidence indicating the plaintiff was at the front of the
vehicle enhanced the probability of the plaintiff's contention. While
the plaintiff was ultimately successful in getting to the jury, Rafferty
demonstrates, again, the showing a plaintiff must make in order to
get a case based on circumstantial evidence to a jury. The plaintiff
was fortunate that any other factual conclusions, in view of the

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 102, 373 A.2d at 67.
Id.
Id. at 103, 373 A.2d at 67.
Id. (emphasis added).
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evidence, would have been contrary to common knowledge, experience and scientific principles. As Peterson indicates, circumstances
surrounding an accident are sometimes more ambiguous than those
in RaffertyYo The Rafferty decision should be seen, therefore, as
underscoring plaintiffs' counsels' need for great care in constructing
such cases.

B.

Cases in Which Res Ipsa Loquitur Is Available

In a case where the plaintiff is relying on the happening of an
occurrence itself for an inference of negligence, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the inference of negligence is more probable than
any other in order to get the issue of negligence to the jury. Making
this showing can be hazardous for a plaintiff attempting to rely on
res ipsa loquitur because it often involves producing evidence about
the occurrence itself. If the plaintiff can explain the occurrence, there
is no longer any justification for reliance on the inference of
negligence. l l l The disappearance of the inference means that the
plaintiff must demonstrate by circumstantial evidence specifically
how the occurrence happened.
The leading case demonstrating this quandary is Hickory
Transfer Co. v. Nezbed. 1I2 That case involved a nighttime crash by
the defendant's truck into the plaintiff's house. There was no
indication that the defendant's truck made any skid marks. The facts
would appear to have presented an appropriate case for submission
to the jury on the basis of res ipsa loquitur. Unfortunately for the
plaintiffs, however, their own evidence was the basis for rejection of
the inference.
The plaintiffs, in presenting their case in Hickory Transfer,
elicited the testimony of a police officer concerning a statement given
to him by the defendant's driver. The statement indicated that the
collision into the plaintiff's house followed a collision with an
automobile at a nearby intersection. The earlier collision was

110. What may have helped negate the defendant's crucial inference that Rafferty
was struck by another vehicle while on the highway, was the presumption
entertained by the court, in light of Rafferty's inability to testify, that he
exercised ordinary care for his own safety. 36 Md. App. at 107-08, 373 A.2d at
69-70. The court so held, in disposing of a contention by the defendant that
Rafferty was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, relying on Nizer v.
Phelps, 252 Md. 185,249 A.2d 112 (1969), and Baltimore Transit Co. v. State ex
reI. Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 71 A.2d 442 (1950). Conceivably, this presumption
lent credence to the inference favoring the plaintiffs recovery.
111. One of the justifications for res ipsa loquitur is the defendant's superior
knowledge concerning the occurrence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (W TORTS 328D,
Comment k (1965).
112. 202 Md. 253, 96 A.2d 241 (1953).

*
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apparently caused by a malfunction of the stoplight controlling
traffic traveling in the same direction as the defendant's truck. The
driver testified that he was unable to avoid hitting the plaintiffs
house. after the first collision because his brakes failed. Brake
failure, standing alone, does not constitute negligence. 113 Thus, the
court of appeals, per Chief Judge Sobel off, found that the plaintiff
had not offered enough evidence for submission to the jury.
It is clear, from the Hickory Transfer court's reaffirmance of and
reliance upon Strasburger u. Vogel,114 that the plaintiff could have
relied on the happening of the occurrence itself to raise the inference
necessary to get the case to the jury.ll5 The attempt to fill in the
details of the occurrence, whether intended to get the case to the jury
by establishing exclusive control, to establish absence of an intervening cause, or to assist the jury when it retired for deliberation,
caused the inference of negligence to vanish. The court found that
the plaintiffs "explained away the possible inference of negligence.
Paradoxically, the plaintiffs proved too much and too little."116
A similar fate befell the plaintiffs in Maszczenski u. Myers. 117
This case involved a suit against a private nursery school by the
parents of a child who was injured in a fall caused by the breaking of
a chain on a swing. The court strongly hinted that the plaintiffs
could have proved the breaking of the chain and then rested, relying
on the inference of negligence to get to the jury. liS The plaintiff,
however, adduced testimony from one of the owners of the school, a
co-defendant, about the maintenance of the chains on the swing. The
plaintiffs expert's testimony indicated that the manner in which the
defendant replaced broken links was negligent, and that issue was
submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiffs also wished to have submitted to the jury the issue
of whether the defendants were negligent in failing to discover,
through inspection, any latent defects in the chain. The judge refused
to submit this issue. While this contention might have been a
premise underlying submission on the basis of res ipsa loquitur, the
allegation and attempted proof of specific grounds of negligence
precluded resort to res ipsa loquitur. The trial judge in Maszczenski,
noted that there was no evidence indicating that a latent defect could
have been discovered.
It is easy to understand, with hindsight, how a plaintiff might be
inclined to prove "too much" for the inference of negligence to

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 261, 96 A.2d at 244.
103 Md. 85, 63 A. 202 (1906).
202 Md. at 263, 96 A.2d at 245.
Id.
212 Md. 346, 129 A.2d 109 (1957>.
Id. at 353, 129 A.2d at 112.
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survive. Failure to prove control by the defendant in a case involving
res ipsa loquitur would be as damaging to the plaintiff as the
disappearance of the inference of negligence.1l9 It can be difficult to
determine in advance what sort of issues which evidence intended to
show the defendant's control over an instrumentality will interject
into a case especially when the witness is hostile and the plaintiff is
unable to contradict the testimony. 120 While the plaintiff may want to
be cautious in introducing evidence which would raise the possibility
of alternative causes of the occurrence, the plaintiff must be aware
that case law in Maryland clearly disfavors a plaintiffs holding back
facts in order to rely on res ipsa loquitur. l2l It is sensible that a
plaintiff should not be able to rely on res ipsa loquitur when the facts
are more available to the plaintiff than to the defendant.
The holding of the court of special appeals in Gleason v. Jack
Alan Enterprises, Inc. 122 appears directed at explaining the degree to
which a plaintiff must come forward to prove defendant's control over
an instrumentality when the plaintiff is relying on res ipsa loquitur.
The plaintiff in Gleason was standing four feet back from the curb
near an intersection when he was struck by defendant's driverless
van. The van had rolled 400-500 feet down an incline before hitting
the plaintiff. At trial, the plaintiff apparently relied almost exclusively on the happening of the occurrence as evidence of negligence.
No testimony was adduced concerning when or how the vehicle had
been parked. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on
the basis that the plaintiff, relying on res ipsa loquitur, had "failed to
establish that the instrumentality causing the injury was within the
exclusive control of the defendant."12:1
On appeal in Gleason, the defendant-appellee relied on Johnson
v. Jackson,124 a case involving a similar mishap. The plaintiff in

119. See Lee v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 462, 101 A.2d 832, 835-36
(1954); cf Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 46, 273 A.2d 412,417-18 (1971)
(plaintitl's evidence consistent with the inference arising from res ipsa loquitor
does not preclude reliance upon that theory).
120. See Trusty v. Wooden, 251 Md. 294, 297, 247 A.2d 382, 384 (1968). See also Plitt
v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 369, 219 A.2d 237, 244 (1966); Proctor Elec. Co. v.
Zink, 217 Md. 22, 32-33, 141 A.2d 721, 726-27 (1958).
121. Johnson v. Jackson, 245 Md. 589, 226 A.2d 883 (1967); Joffre v. Canada Dry
Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960). In Livingston v. Stewart &
Co., 194 Md. 155, 160, 69 A.2d 900, 902 (1949), the court of appeals observed
that:
never in Maryland - and seldom, if ever, elsewhere - has it been held
that, if the facts do not give rise to a reasonable inference of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, who has the burden of proof. can
make out a case by proving that he is ignorant of other facts or knows
less about them than the defendant.
122. 36 Md. App. 562, 374 A.2d 408 (1977).
123. [d. at 564, 374 A.2d at 410.
124. 245 Md. 589, 226 A.2d 883 (1967).

1980]

Directed Verdict

243

Johnson, who was hit by the driverless vehicle, testified on crossexamination, but not on direct nor in the course of discovery, about
hearing a child yelling immediately before the occurrence. This
apparently available knowledge about what may have been the
cause of the injury prevented the plaintiff from relying on res ipsa
loquitur. There was no evidence in Gleason that the plaintiff
possessed or had access to any similar knowledge. 125 The court held
that factors such as the passage of time might be considered by a jury
as to the issue of exclusive control but made clear that the plaintiff
was not required to establish exclusive control by showing the time
and circumstances of the parking of the vehicle. The court noted that
such a requirement would emasculate the inference arising under res
ipsa loquitur. Requiring the plaintiff to shoulder such a burden
would increase the number of instances in which the plaintiffs
would, in essence, stumble over their own proof. Clearly Gleason, in
a very pragmatic way, has lessened the burden on a plaintiff
attempting to demonstrate the exclusive control of the defendant
over the injury-producing instrumentality.126 Gleason indicates that a
plaintiff relying on res ipsa loquitur cannot suffer a directed verdict
through failure to come forward to explain that which circumstances
dictate he cannot reasonably be expected to explain.
The opinion in Gleason is a constructive step in resolving the
quandary of a plaintiff seeking to rely on res ipsa loquitur and yet
who is fearful of so doing because of the limitations it imposes on
proof. Yet, Gleason effectuates use of res ipsa loquitur in those cases
in which its use is most appropriate, instances when the plaintiffs
knowledge is, by happenstance, scant.
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, the intent of this article is to examine the
less obvious applications of Maryland Rule 552. In the ordinary civil
jury trial, the plaintiffs sole practical concern is what happens once
the case gets to the jury. A motion for directed verdict by the
defendant is perfunctory and usually unsuccessful.

125. Neither side produced the driver of the van, who was no longer employed by the
defendant at the time of trial. 36 Md. App. at 570, 374 A.2d at 412-13.
126. This appears in line with the holding in Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co.,
261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971>, which held that the requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate exclusive control was not to be applied literally. Gleason
appears to be a more liberal holding from a plaintiffs point of view, because in
Leikach there was rather involved testimony tending to establish exclusive
control, the sort of testimony that proved troublesome in Strasburger and
Hickory Transfer.
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Counsel should note, however, that in a limited number of
situations the plaintiff must, before getting to a jury, demonstrate
that the plaintiffs evidence outweighs evidence or inferences that
have been or may be raised against his or her case. That these
special situations may be based upon policy rather than logic in a
very strict sense is no reproach to the reasoning of the decisions
which mandate them. Fixation of liability itself involves resolution
of important questions of fairness and social policy.m It is important,
however, that counsel recognize that a motion for directed verdict is
much more likely to playa decisive role in the outcome of such cases.
Thus, counsel should plan trial strategy accordingly.

127. Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16, 264 A.2d 851, 855 (1970).

